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THOSE WHO CAN, TEACH 
 
Darwin's Unfinished Symphony: How Culture Made the Human Mind.  By Kevin N. 
Laland (2017).  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  xiv, 450 pp. $35.00 (hardcover).  
ISBN 978-0-691-15118-2. 
 
Humans are different from other animals in unique ways.  The biggest difference is that 
we can talk.  Language lets us coordinate group actions minutely, pass along knowledge 
in limitless detail, discuss what was, will be, or might be, and think in ways that are 
impossible for nonhuman creatures.  Almost everything that is uniquely human hangs 
from that linguistic hook.   
 
For Darwinian evolutionists seeking to explain human origins, language poses a problem.  
Other animals don't have it, even in a rudimentary form.  They can make noises or 
gestures that mean things like "Let's hook up," or "Eek!"  Some of them have special 
signals with narrower meanings, like "Eek— a leopard!" But all these signals are context-
specific stimuli, aimed at evoking a specific response in others.  Nonhumans apparently 
have no way of talking about anything -- of saying "I hate leopards," or "Was it a leopard 
that ate Mom?"  And if evolution proceeds in incremental steps by modifying existing 
traits, what materials could natural selection have worked with to move from the time-
bound and instrumental signals of nonhuman communication to the time-binding, 
referential structures of human language? 
 
Various scenarios have been proposed for the origin of language, but they all fail to 
explain why it should be restricted to humans.  Language seems like such a valuable 
adaptation that it's hard to see why other animals haven't hit on it.  Animals as diverse as 
apes, dolphins, and parrots have proved capable of learning and using "protolanguage" 
(semantics without syntax).  But they don't, not without human intervention.  Why not? 
Why are we unique?  What was special early on about the human lineage that caused it to 
go down a path unexplored by any other animals?  No very convincing answer to these 
questions has been hit on.  Some major thinkers have thrown up their hands and proposed 
non-Darwinian stories, in which language appeared when a mysterious mutation brought 
syntax into being out of nowhere some 100,000 years ago.1 
 
Kevin Laland sees the puzzle of human uniqueness as the missing keystone to the 
Darwinian arch.  He has devoted more than 25 years to trying to fill in that missing piece, 
using approaches and findings drawn from several sciences to construct a grand synthetic 
theory of anthropogenesis.  This book is the result.  The book's title implies a comparison 
with Darwin; and the comparison is not absurd.  Like Darwin, Laland has gathered an 
breathtaking array of seemingly disconnected facts and assembled them into an imposing 
structure that goes a long way toward solving an ancient and intractable problem.   
 
Laland begins by examining behavioral copying in animals.  Social learning of behavior 
through observation is common in many animals, from apes to social insects.  Animals 
don't copy others blindly; they follow rules and strategies. Laland shows, using ingenious 
mathematical models (developed in a fittingly Darwinian fashion by offering a €10,000 
prize for the winner of a contest between competing algorithms), that the best copying 
strategy is to avoid "asocial learning" (trial-and-error innovations), copy a couple of 
behaviors observed to be successful, and keep using them while evaluating them and 
remaining open to novel alternatives.  Copying actually increases the diversity of learned 
behaviors; when all learning is asocial, innovations are quickly lost.  Experiments with 
aquarium fish taught Laland a lot about strategies for social learning and innovation.  
Heavily armored three-spined sticklebacks are incapable of social learning.  But their 
poorly armored nine-spined relatives, at greater risk from predators, have short, 
intermittent feeding bouts that compel them to watch others and copy and continually re-
evaluate successful feeding strategies, producing a cumulative knowledge gain 
reminiscent of the "ratcheting" effect in human cultural evolution.  Similar 
"metastrategies" -- strategies for learning strategies -- are documented in other species. 
 
But in all these animals, socially learned innovations tend to evaporate over time.  They 
don't accumulate and provide a substrate for further innovations, as they do in humans.  
What accounts for the difference?  Laland shows that the crucial variable is the fidelity of 
copying.  Nonhuman copying is noisy and inaccurate, and a lot of irrelevant aspects of 
the behavior get transmitted along with the useful parts.  The only factor that ensures the 
high-fidelity, high-payoff copying needed for a new behavior to persist is active teaching 
— behavior specifically evolved for the purpose of passing on skills and knowledge.  
Active teaching is almost unknown among nonhumans, because its costs to the instructor 
outweigh its benefits.  Theory and computer models indicate that teaching can be counted 
on to have a positive payoff for the instructor only if the pupil is a close relative (kin 
selection), the act of teaching has a low cost for the instructor, and the behavior is 
moderately hard to learn.  (Easily learned behaviors are more efficiently acquired in other 
ways, and very difficult behaviors are hard to teach.) 
 
This is where language comes in.  Borrowing from the linguist Derek Bickerton, Laland 
articulates seven criteria for an adequate theory of language origins.  Primordial 
language, he suggests, had to (1) be honest, (2) be mutually profitable to the speaker and 
the listener, (3) denote something in the real world, and (4) operate in multiple situations.  
It had to (5) provide a benefit from the very beginning, with a tiny initial lexicon — say, 
ten words.  A satisfactory theory must (6) account for why language evolved as learned 
rather than instinctive behavior, and (7) explain why it appeared in no other animal 
lineages.  Laland argues that the teaching of stone-tool making to closely related 
juveniles meets all these criteria. (In this model, the first words would presumably have 
been, not nouns like "leopard," but a short list of commands, adverbs, and logical 
operators: stop, yes, no, thus, again, here, harder, and the like.)  Laland can't think of 
another, equally plausible context for early language that meets all seven criteria; and 
neither can I. 
 
Once language appears in this context, it is not hard to derive the rest of the bundle of 
human peculiarities — huge brains, fire, cooking, reduced teeth and jaws, protracted life 
history, prosociality, and so on — from various evolutionary feedback loops between the 
genome and the domain of accumulating culture. Laland devotes the latter half of his 
book to doing just that.   He ends by analyzing the arts, which he sees as having roots in 
an innate human relish for language-guided copying.  Drawing and painting stem from 
imitation of visual images, and dance and music are related to the entrainment of motion, 
as in the case of Snowball, the famous dancing cockatoo.  I wasn't entirely convinced by 
this account (what, exactly, is a Haida bent box or a Bach fugue entraining, or copying?), 
but it is surely part of the truth, and it represents a step forward from the ideas that our 
esthetic responses derive from the perception of beauty in exploitable landscapes or the 
bodies of sexual partners. 
 
A lot of this part of the book is familiar territory.  The unique human capacities for 
imitation, prosociality, normative behavior and morality, niche construction, and so forth 
have often been noted before.  Causal connections between them have been traced by 
theorists going all the way back to Darwin and Engels.2  But Laland brings them all 
together into a single framework that encompasses and tries to account for these disparate 
peculiarities of our species in terms of a single underlying principle.  In this respect, at 
least, his book really did remind me of The Origin of Species.  Though Laland's tone is 
less diffident and more first-personal, his long argument resembles Darwin's in its 
meticulous concern for its own problems and shortcomings.  He is seldom content just to 
postulate a plausible causal relationship; he looks for confirmation in field and laboratory 
observations, and isn't satisfied until he has tested the relationship in a computer model.  
Reading this book, I often had another experience familiar to readers of Darwin: when 
some iffy idea made me exclaim "But what about X?" I found that the next page was all 
about X. 
 
There are holes in Laland's argument, as there were in Darwin's.  He ignores the old 
theory, revived by the describers of Ardipithecus,3 that the apes didn't follow a humanlike 
evolutionary path because they adopted the fatal habit of brachiation, which converted 
their potentially tool-making hands into clumsy hooks.  Current evidence doesn't really 
support Laland's claim that "increases in hominin brain size coincide with advances in 
technology."4:224 And his historical narrative needs to be tweaked to deal with Shea's 
recent claim that habitual stone tool use didn't kick in until well after the first appearance 
of Homo.5   
 
But Darwin's Unfinished Symphony is still a landmark accomplishment.  Future writing 
about human evolution and language origins will have to deal with and incorporate 
Laland's ideas and arguments.  His book can be counted on to have a distinguished future 
in academic circles.  It offers a fresh approach to some territory that has been fruitlessly 
explored for centuries.  It will appeal both to those who stress human uniqueness and to 
those who insist on our behavioral and mental continuity with nonhumans. And what 
teacher — including me — won't warm to a theory that says teaching is what made us 
human? 
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